what these assumptions are, hence allowing other researchers to evaluate and expand our analysis. We also provide extensive sensitivity analyses investigating how c hanges in these assumptions impact results. This paper is organized into 7 sections. In section 2, we review some of the existing empirical literature examining the VERs on automobiles. In section 3, we outline the underlying theoretical model used here to evaluate the VERs, while section 4 discusses the methodology used to estimate this model. Section 5 presents a discussion of policy details, the data, and the base case results while section 6 is focussed on determining how robust our results are to several alternative theoretical and econometric specications. Conclusions and caveats are gathered in section 7.
The Previous Literature.
At the most general level, we hope this paper might contribute to the debate on the applicability of the insights of the strategic trade policy literature. On the one hand, some of the economists most responsible for the development of the theory of strategic trade policy have argued eloquently against its use in the public policy arena. See, for example, Paul Krugman's (1994) Peddling Prosperity. On the other hand, the insights from the the strategic trade policy literature appear to have struck a c hord with some currently powerful policymakers and advisors.
Since the early theoretical models are now o v er a decade old, one might h a v e expected that there would be several econometric studies investigating exactly this question in a multitude of industries. We know of no econometric studies of strategic trade policy. This absence is documented in the recent review of empirical studies of trade policy by Robert Feenstra (1995) . As noted in Feenstra's survey, the empirical studies of strategic trade policy have been simulation models in which simple theoretical models are parameterized and experiments run.
While we know of no econometric studies investigating the ecacy of an implemented (possibly) strategic trade policy, there have been several studies of international trade and the U.S. automobile industry. While a complete survey of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, we provide an overview of some of this work. (See Levinsohn (1994) for an extended survey.)
Some of the rst studies of the eects of VERs on the U.S. automobile industry were by Robert Feenstra (1984) and . These studies focused on the phenomenon now referred to as quality upgrading. Feenstra documented that when the VERs were implemented, the list prices of Japanese cars as well as the base-model characteristics of those cars increased. Using data from 1979 to 1985, for by corresponding increases in \quality," such as more horsepower, larger vehicle size, and the like. Hence, if one only looked at the change in prices, without adjusting for the concurrent c hange in quality, one would over-estimate the price rise due to the VERs.
Avinash Dixit (1988) constructed a simple simulation model of the U.S. automobile industry in which there were two t ypes of products, U.S. and Japanese. Assuming linear inverse demands and constant marginal cost, Dixit calibrated his model to perfectly t data that were aggregated in this way. This was done for the industry in 1979 and again for 1980. Drawing on elasticities and estimates of marginal cost from various sources, Dixit computed the optimal strategic trade policy and compared the welfare gain this would have yielded relative to the simpler policy of levying a standard Most Favored Nation tari of 2.9 percent. Dixit found that the gains from employing strategic trade policy would have been very small{ on the order of 17 to 300 million dollars depending on the policy tools adopted and the parameters selected.
Elias Dinopoulos and Mordechai Kreinin (1988) treat the U.S. automobile industry as a homogeneous product perfectly competitive industry with linear supply and demand schedules and compute the triangles that comprise the deadweight loss from the quality-adjusted price increase the VER induced.
A more recent and more sophisticated empirical investigation of the eect of the automobile VERs on the United States is Pinelopi Goldberg (1995) . 2 In that paper, Goldberg estimates a structural oligopoly model of the U.S. automobile industry using both product-level data and consumer level data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Her annual data cover 1983 to 1987. Goldberg rst estimates a logit-based demand system from the consumer data in the CES. This yields demand elasticities that feed into the oligopolistic rms' prot maximizing rst order conditions. These rst order conditions result from multi-product rms maximizing prots in a Bertrand fashion. Goldberg nds that the VERs were binding in 1983, 1984 , and again but much less so in 1987. A principal message of Goldberg's paper is that the main eect of the VERs came immediately after they were imposed and that in later years the policy had little or no eect. Goldberg reports on the prot shifting aspect of the trade policy, but notes that \the objective o f our analysis is not to compute national welfare, but to assess the quota impact on prices, production and market shares..." We return to her conclusions after presenting our results.
We address the broader question of whether the VERs were sound U.S. public policy. In particular, when the entire picture of U.S. rm prots, consumer welfare, and government revenues 2 A less technical paper that also addresses many of these issues is Goldberg (1994). are considered, who were the winners, who were the losers, and what was the magnitude of these gains and losses? To address these questions, we use a structural model of static oligopoly. This model is presented in the next section.
A Model of VERs in Oligopoly
To proceed we need a model of demand and supply for the new car market. The model we use has four primitives; i) a distribution for consumer utility functions, ii) a distribution for producer cost functions, iii) a specication for the rules governing the impacts of the VER's, and iv) a behavioral assumption which determines equilibrium. We take our specication for the distribution of the utility and cost surfaces from our earlier work (BLP, 1995) which w e review briey now. We next provide our specication for the VER's and then consider alternative equilibrium concepts.
Utility and Demand
Our demand system is obtained by explicitly aggregating over the discrete choices of individuals with dierent c haracteristics. 3 The utility that a consumer derives from a given choice depends upon the interaction between the consumer's characteristics, to be denoted by , and the product's characteristics. Thus the preference for a car of a particular size may depend on family size, while price tradeos may depend on family income. We distinguish between three kinds of product characteristics; those that are observed by the econometrician but determined before the current period (such as horsepower and vehicle size) to be denoted by x, price, or p, which is also observed but may b e c hanged in every period, and unobserved (by us) product characteristics, denoted by . The vector is meant to take account o f c haracteristics that are observed by market participants, but are either inherently dicult to measure (such as \prestige") or are potentially measurable but are not included in our specications (usually because of a lack of data).
The consumer has J+1 choices. She can choose to purchase one of the J cars marketed, or she can choose not to purchase a new car. We let the (indirect) utility derived by consumer i from choosing alternative j be U( i ; p j ; x j ; j ; ) ;
where is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Consumer i chooses alternative j if and only if U( i ; p j ; x j ; j ; ) U ( i ; p r ; x r ; r ; ), for r = 0 ; 1 ; :::; J;
3 For a discussion of the advantages of demand systems obtained in this way, and a review of the relevant literature, see BLP, 1995 , and the literature cited therein. 5 where alternatives r = 1 ; :::; J represent purchases of the competing dierentiated products. Alternative zero, or the outside alternative, represents the option of not purchasing any of those products and allocating all expenditures to other commodities. It is the presence of this alternative that allows us to model changes in the total quantity of automobile purchases.
Let A j () be the set of values of that induce the choice of good j when the parameter vector is :
A j () = f : U ( ; p j ; x j ; j ; ) U ( ; p r ; x r ; r ; ) ;for r = 0 ; 1 ; :::; J g :
The market share, s j , of a product is given by computing the fraction of the population with 2 A j . That is, s j (p; x; ; ) =
where P 0 provides the distribution of .
A note on functional forms is appropriate here. Computational constraints have frequently induced the traditional discrete choice literature to analyze models in which utility is additively separable into a component that depends only on product-level attributes, say j , and a disturbance, say ij ; i.e. U( i ; p j ; x j ; j ; ) = j + i;j . The i;j are assumed to be independently and identically distributed across choices, as the specication then enables one to compute market shares from the solution to a unidimensional integral (if, in addition, the are distributed multivariate extreme value, the needed integral has an analytic form). However, the computational simplicity that these assumptions produce comes at a large cost. These assumptions result in a model which, no matter the parameter estimates (or the precise values of the j ), implies that when consumers substitute away from one product they will not substitute towards products with similar characteristics, but rather to products with large market shares; a fact which leads to counterintuitive cross-price elasticities (see BLP,1995) . 4 To enable richer substitution patterns we allow dierent consumers to have dierent i n tensities of preferences for dierent c haracteristics. We do this in a tractable way via a random coecients 4 Related properties of the standard assumptions have been noted by several authors and have led to several alternative modeling assumptions. Probably the most well known of the modications is the nested logit. In the nested logit the researcher provides an a priori classication of products into groups and then has substitution patterns constrained only between members of the same group and between a member of one group and members of any other group (see Cardell, 1991 , for an intuitive discussion). An alternative, and one which is closer to our specication, is the random coecients model used by Hausman and Wise, 1978 . This specication does not produce an analytic integral for the shares. However, if the dimension of the random coecients is small enough (as it was in the Hausman and Wise case), numerical integration can be used to solve for those shares. 6 utility specication. The utility function for consumer i, considering products indexed by j, i s u ij =x j + j i p j + k k x jk ik + ij for j = 1 ; :::; J; while u i0 = 0 i0 + i0 :
The ij are traditional i.i.d. extreme value (\logit") draws, which capture an idiosyncratic taste of this consumer for this product. The term x j + j , where is a parameter to be estimated, is common to all consumers. This term allows the mean level of utility t o v ary with observed and unobserved characteristics. Consumers then have a distribution of tastes for each of the product characteristics. For each c haracteristic k, consumer i has a taste ik , which is drawn from an i.i.d. standard normal. The parameters k capture the variance in consumer tastes. Similarly, the parameter 0 captures additional variance in consumers' tastes for the outside good. Because the outside good is in fact a broad category including, e.g., all used cars and public transport, we expect the idiosyncratic variance for this alternative to be larger than the variance for the \inside" goods.
The term i is the consumer's distaste for price increases. As in BLP, w e assume that the distribution of i varies with income. Accordingly, w e assume that i has a time-varying distribution that is a log-normal approximation to the distribution of income in U.S. households in each y ear.
If y i is a draw from this log-normal income distribution, then i = y i ;
where is a parameter to be estimated. In this way, price sensitivity is modeled as inversely proportional to income.
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Because the utility specication in (3) allows consumers to dier in their preferences for product attributes, consumers who substitute out of, say, a large car, will tend to be consumers who like large cars, and, precisely because of this preference, will substitute disproportionately to other large cars. As a result, the specication in (3) allows for a much richer set of substitution patterns than does vthe traditional logit model.
The random coecient generalization of the logit model does, however, carry the cost of an increased computational burden. Now, to obtain the market shares implied by the model we will need to evaluate a k + 1-dimensional integral. As shown in Pakes(1986) , this aggregation problem can be solved by simulation.
This functional form for the interaction between income and price can be derived as a rst-order Taylor series approximation to the \Cobb-Douglas" utility function used in BLP.
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The other novel feature of our model is the allowance for unmeasured product attributes, the j . Just as with the disturbances in the homogeneous goods supply and demand model, these unobserved characteristics are not integrated out in computing aggregate demand. Hence, they are a real source of dierence between the aggregate predictions of the model and the actual data. As one might suspect, however, the j also generate a dierentiated product analogue to the econometric endogeneity problem we are familiar with from the homogeneous goods model. That is, unmeasured characteristics, such as perceived reliability or prestige, are likely to be determinants of and hence correlated with the product's price. If the econometric endogeneity of price is unaccounted for in the estimation algorithm, it will generate inconsistent estimates of the demand elasticities. Berry (1994) suggests using an inversion routine to solve for the , and then instrumental variable techniques to estimate the parameters, and BLP provides a simple way of implementing these suggestions (see below). BLP also shows that the bias generated by the econometric endogeneity of price is likely to be empirically important.
6
This completes the discussion of the utility side of our model. We n o w turn our attention to the rm's problem.
Firms, Costs, and Equilibrium Prices
The rm side of the model is straightforward. In any given year, there are F rms, each o f which produces some subset of the J products, J f . The decision of which products (bundles of characteristics) are produced in any y ear is assumed to be predetermined outside of our model. Marginal costs are assumed to depend on observed product attributes, country-specic cost shifters such a s w ages and exchange rates, and an unobserved productivity v ariable. The product attributes that enter marginal cost may be the same as those that determine utility (though this is not necessary), and the unobserved productivity term may be correlated with the unobserved product attributes (or the j ). Note that we assume that marginal costs are independent of output levels. The decision to model a product's marginal cost as constant is the result of our data limitations. We do not observe w orldwide output of foreign models and this, not just sales in the U.S., is what marginal cost might v ary against (see the discussion in BLP). In addition, almost all 6 As an example, when we do not account for the endogeneity of price, several products are estimated to face inelastic demands; this is problematic in an oligopoly model.
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Modeling the rm's decision of which products to produce conditional on its beliefs about the products other rms will produce and the state of future demand in a multi-dimensional dierentiated products oligopoly is an important and very dicult problem that is beyond the scope of this paper. 8 researchers since Bresnahan (1981) have adopted the constant marginal cost assumption. 8 Using a logarithmic specication then, the marginal cost of product j is written as: ln(mc) j = w j + ! j ; (4) where is a vector of parameters to be estimated, w j is a vector of observed marginal cost shifters, and ! is the unobserved productivity term.
To m o v e from demand and costs to industry equilibrium requires two modeling decisions. First, how should the VER be modeled? Second, what is the equilibrium concept { Cournot, Bertrand, or something yet dierent?
When Japan \voluntarily" agreed to reduce automobile exports in May, 1981, the agreement pertained to total exports from Japan. These were to be limited to 1.68 million units (a gure that increased in later years.) The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan then essentially divided this limit across the Japanese automakers. It has been suggested that a rm's allocation depended in various ways on past sales or market shares, and this is surely true, but there is not a (publicly available) hard and fast formula used by MITI.
Modeling the VER raises several issues. There is a large literature discussing tari-quota equivalences or non-equivalences in the presence of imperfect competition, and the lessons from that literature might, at rst glance, appear relevant here. For example, Bhagwati (1969) showed that in a linear monopoly model, taris and quotas might be non-equivalent. In an oligopoly setting, Krishna (1989) has demonstrated that when rms compete by setting quantities (as in Cournot), the quota and an appropriately set specic tari are equivalent, in that they yield the same equilibrium. This is not the case when rms set prices. Krishna notes that with a VER or quota on the foreign rm, the home rm's best response function is discontinuous, and there need not be an equilibrium in pure strategies.
However, in light o f h o w the VER was actually implemented, we believe that the target levels of exports MITI allocated to the rms should not be viewed as rm specic quotas. Failure to meet the target presumably impacted negatively on the rm's relationship with MITI and probably on the rm's future allocations. It did not prevent an additional unit from being exported. (It is often claimed that Suburu and Honda exceeded their allocations in early years of the VER.) Rather, the rm would have t o e v aluate these costs and decide on a course of action. As a result we c hoose to model the impact of the rm specic limits as a tax on exports in excess of that limit. The tax rate is the implicit unit cost of exceeding MITI's limits, and becomes a parameter to be estimated.
For simplicity, w e begin with the case in which the VER is implemented as an implicit tax on 
where M denotes the market size and V E R is a dummy v ariable that is set to one if the car is subject to the tax. Initially assume that the equilibrium is Nash in prices, i.e. at equilibrium each rm is setting each of its product prices to maximize total rm prots conditional on the prices charged by the other rms and the characteristics of all the cars marketed. Provided such an equilibrium exists, the resulting prices must satisfy the rst order conditions: s j (p; x; ; ) + r 2J f (p r mc r V ER) @s r (p; x; ; ) @p j = 0 :
In the simple case where there is one product per rm, equation (6) sets a price equal to marginal cost plus the tax (where applicable) plus a markup equal to the inverse of the elasticity of demand for that product. For our multi-product rms the markup is more complicated as the rm takes account of the eect of a change in the price of one of its product on the prots earned from all of its products. In particular if we let the vector of markups for the multi-product rm case be b(p; x; ; ), then b(p; x; ; ) (p; x; ; ) 1 s(p; x; ; );
where is a J by J matrix whose (j; r) element is given by: jr = @s r @p j ; if r and j are produced by the same rm; 0; otherwise.
Given the markups, or b(p; x; ; ), and our model for marginal costs, (4), the rst order conditions can be rearranged to yield ln(mc j ) = ln(p j b j (p; x; ; ) V ER j ) = w j + ! j :
Note that in (8), the VER, as modeled, looks like a specic (as opposed to an ad valorum ) tari. That is, the VER raises prices by an amount in excess of cost plus markup. It is this aspect of the VER that may h a v e led rms to adjust their product mix by upgrading (as documented empirically by F eenstra, and as modeled theoretically by Das and Donnenfeld, 1987, and Krishna, 1987) .
The rst-order condition in (8) is restrictive in several ways. First, it assumes that the same tax is placed on each rm. It has been suggested that since the VERs were allocated according to a formula that placed heavy weight on past market shares, it penalized the smaller upstart rms more heavily. Honda, in particular, claimed that they were more constrained in the early years of the VER, while other rms were less so. To i n v estigate this possibility, our robustness analysis includes runs that estimate separate tax rates for large and small Japanese rms (where the division is admittedly somewhat arbitrary).
Note, however, that the rst-order condition in (8) does not require that the tax be placed on each unit produced, but only on the marginal units. MITI might exempt some initial level of production from any political pressure. For our purposes, the level of the exemption might vary across rms, as long as the marginal tax rate was the same. Depending on how w e modeled exemptions, they might once again place a discontinuity in the rms' reaction functions which might in turn lead to existence problems. We assume that either the exemptions do not cause problems or else that the tax rate is in fact applied to all units of production.
We also investigate the robustness of our results to the assumption that equilibrium is Nash in prices. The eect of any c hange in the equilibrium assumption will be to change the denition of the markups, or b(p; x; ; ), in equation (7). One familiar alternative to our Bertrand assumption (Nash in prices) is to assume that rms play a Cournot game (Nash in quantities). The problem with this is that few, if any, industry observers seem to believe that, in the automobile industry, rms really set quantities and let the Walrasian auctioneer set the prices that clear markets. From Bresnahan (1981) on, researchers have modeled imperfect competition in the automobile industry in a Bertrand fashion. One might, however, posit a Nash game in which Japanese rms set quantities (subject to the export limits set by MITI), but the rest of the rms set prices. This is an approach empirically adopted by F eenstra and and coined Mixed Nash. Another possibility is that the VER somehow \taught" the Japanese rms to collude, and these colluding rms played a Bertrand game with the rest of the world. In section 6, we examine the robustness of our results by estimating the model under the Cournot, the Mixed Nash, and the collusion assumptions.
In concluding, we w ould like to stress that our estimates do not assume the VER raised prices in every year. If it had no eect on prices in a particular year, we ought to estimate a which i s within estimation error of zero in that year.
This completes the discussion of the theory underlying our structural model. The key parameters to be estimated are those characterizing the distribution of tastes in the population, , , and , those determining marginal costs , and the tax rates associated with the VERs, the 's. The parameters on the demand side will permit us to evaluate how consumer welfare changes with the VER. These plus the cost side parameters allow us to estimate the eect of the VERs on the distribution of prots. The 's measure the implicit tax on Japanese cars and allow us to compute the revenue foregone by the implementation of a VER (modeled essentially as an export tax by Japan) instead of a tari imposed by the U.S. (assuming a tari could be implemented without changing any of the other details of the problem, including the cars that are marketed in the U.S.). One needs these pieces of information, or something very close to them, to evaluate this strategic trade policy.
Estimation and Computation
We closely follow the estimation methods detailed in BLP. Here we outline those methods referring the interested reader to BLP for details.
Overview. As in an OLS or two-stage least squares estimation procedure, we base our estimates on a set of moment restrictions. In particular, we assume that the unobservables dened by the model, evaluated at the true values of the parameters, are mean independent of a set of exogenous
Equation (9) implies that the unobservables are uncorrelated with any function, H j (), of the instruments. Dening
equation (10) implies
F ollowing the literature on Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Hansen, 1982 ) then, we c hoose as our estimate of that value that comes \closest" to setting the sample analog of the moments in equation (9) to zero. This sample analogue is
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The GMM estimator then minimizes
where for any v ector y, kyk A J = y 0 A J y, and where the matrix A J converges in probability t o some positive denite matrix A (we use the sample analogue of EG J ( 1 )G J ( 1 ) 0 , where 1 is an initial consistent estimate of 0 , as our A J ). Under suitable regularity conditions this estimate is consistent and asymptotically normal with covariance matrix detailed below.
To make use of the method, we m ust be able to calculate the unobservables as functions of the data at dierent v alues of the parameter vector. BLP provides a simple method for doing this computation and we follow this method exactly.
We turn next to the choice of instruments, z.
Instruments. The estimation method as outlined requires us to nd a vector of observables, the z vector, that are mean independent of the unobservables (and are in that sense \econometrically exogenous"), and then use functions of them, the H j (z), as instruments. Since all the equilibrium notions discussed above imply that the p and q of every product are functions of the (, !) pairs of all products, we do not want to place price and quantity i n t h e z v ector. This is precisely the same reasoning that leads to the use of instruments for price and quantity in the analysis of demand and supply in homogeneous goods markets.
As in the analysis of homogeneous goods markets we look for observables that shift the demand and cost functions to use as the components of z. In the dierentiated products framework these include the characteristics of all the products marketed (their size, fuel eciency, acceleration, etc.), or the observed x vectors, as well as the variables, such a s w age rates, that determine costs conditional on product characteristics, or the components of the observed w vectors that are not included in x.
for any given product will be a function of the x and w vectors of all the products marketed (see Chamberlin, 1986 , for a discussion of ecient instruments given conditional moment restrictions.) In the appendix, we develop an easy to compute approximation to the ecient instruments; these are used in our estimates.
Some facts about the VERs
Moving from the oligopoly model described in section 3 to the data requires a more detailed discussion of exactly how the VER worked. As noted in the introduction, the VER was initiated in May 1981 and at that point total exports were limited to 1.68 million cars. In 1984, this gure increased to 1.85 million. In 1985, Japan voluntarily agreed to extend its already nominally voluntary export restraint, and from 1985 through early 1992, exports were limited to 2.30 million. Following President Bush's visit to Japan, the allocation was reduced back to 1.65 million in 1992. The VER was formally lifted in 1994.
A reasonable rst pass at the data might include gures on rm-level allocations and shipments. However even if this data were available it would not suce for the questions of interest. For example, one might note that rms just met their allocation, but it could still be that the quota was just barely binding, hence Japanese prices might not rise appreciably. On the other hand, it could be that some rms met their allocations, and some did not, and the overall eect might b e ambiguous. Yet again, it could be that rms did not sell their entire allocations because they were worried about possible repercussions of inadvertently exceeding the limits. Finally, it could be that rms faced continual pressure from MITI to limit exports to the U.S. and, while MITI might h a v e been hesitant to commit to a lower aggregate limit, it may h a v e pressured rms in subtle ways to keep prices high and sales low. The bottom line is that data on allocations and sales are less informative than one might initially guess, and this is why a structural model is especially useful.
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The VER was structured such that cars produced by Japanese rms in the United States did not count against the VER. This production via direct foreign investment (d) was an empirically important phenomenon. Beginning with Honda's Marysville plant in 1982, Japanese rms responded to the VER by producing in the U.S. By 1990, Honda, Nissan, Toyota, Mazda, and Mitsubishi were producing in the U.S.. In our base case, the VER dummy v ariable was set to zero for all Japanese models that had production facilities in the U.S., although the prots accruing to these 12 The situation is actually much w orse than the previous discussion indicates as reliable gures on the allocations are simply not available. Professor Gary Saxonhouse kindly provided the data, attributed to MITI, that he has on allocations and shipments. They indicate that from 1981 to 1986 every rm managed to hit its allocation exactly and no rm ever missed by e v en one vehicle. We nd these gures simply not credible, as they appear manufactured more for political purposes than for econometric analyses. In this context we note that though it is hard for us to verify the MITI gures, we h a v e made some rough calculations. Diculties arise mainly because our sales data are by calendar year while the MITI gures are by VER-year (May through April), and the MITI gures refer to shipments and these need not equal sales, although over time these two should more or less even out. Though the reader should keep these caveats in mind, when we did investigate we found that the MITI gures do not mesh well with the actual sales gures. models were classied as Japanese prots. For cars produced in both Japan and the U.S. (and prominent examples of this for the latter part of our sample period are the Honda Accord and the Toyota Camry), this amounts to assuming that the marginal car sold was produced in the U.S. 13 We experiment with the assumption that the marginal car was produced in Japan, and hence that the VER dummy should be set to one for these models, in section 6.
The VER was also structured such that cars imported from Japan and sold under a U.S. brand were counted against the VER. These so-called captive imports were cars usually produced by Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and Isuzu and sold under the Dodge/Chrysler or Geo labels by Chrysler and General Motors respectively. In the estimation, we carefully account for these captive imports as their quantities are signicant. In the sensitivity analyses, we experiment with ignoring captive imports and see if our policy conclusions are altered. It is unclear whether the prots from these cars should accrue to their Japanese manufacturers or the U.S. rms whose name they bear. We somewhat arbitrarily assume that prots accrue to the U.S. rm in this case, although the truth is surely somewhere between these two polar cases.
We n o w turn to a discussion of the data used in the estimation.
Data All of our product-level data are obtained from the Automotive News Market Data Book (annual issues). These data include information on most engineering specications of the automobiles marketed. The data span the period 1971 to 1990. In terms of the theory presented in Section 2, these data comprise the product attributes. They include continuous characteristics such as the car's horsepower, weight, length, width, wheelbase, engine displacement, and EPA miles per gallon rating. The data also include binary variables such as whether air conditioning, power steering, power brakes, and automatic transmission are standard equipment. Each model is in fact available in many v ariants (termed trim levels) and the list of standard equipment and specications typically varies across trim levels. In order to keep the number of products computationally manageable, we include only the base model for each nameplate. It is important, then, that the price variable be that which also applies to the base model, and this is done.
We h a v e list prices for each product. This is not ideal, but we think it is the best that can be done with our present data sources. The alternative is something akin to the average transaction price, where the average is taken for all purchases of a given nameplate. Such data are in fact 13 For a more detailed examination of how d w orks in a model of oligopoly and quotas, see Levinsohn (1989). 16 available (but are proprietary) for many, though not all, models in the later years of our sample. It turns out that transactions prices for a given model are almost always higher than its list price. This is because very few cars are actually purchased without any options, and the purchase of options drives up the transaction price. Without detailed information on the relationship between options and transaction prices, the transactions prices are of limited use. 14 We also make use of some macroeconomic data. These variables include exchange rates, consumer price deators (in order to put all prices into real terms), the prime interest rate, the Gross National Product, and foreign wages. These are obtained from annual issues of the Economic Report of the President and the OECD Main Economic Indicators. Finally, w e require information about the number of households and the distribution of income in the United States. These data are obtained from the Current P opulation Survey. 15 We next consider some general trends in key variables. Table 1 provides some market averages, while Table 2 focuses more narrowly on trends in U.S. and Japanese competition. Table 1 lists the number of models, average sales and real price, and four key attributes for [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . It is clear that the number of models climbed fairly steadily until 1988, while the average sales per model declined. The deated price of automobiles has risen steadily since 1974, although a noticeably larger than average blip appears in 1981, the year the VERs were initiated, and then again in 1982. Note also, however, that a smaller blip in prices occurred in 1980, a year before the introduction of the VER's, and there is an equally large series of increases in real prices between 1985-1987. Moreover, an almost identical series of increases occur in the variable, \Air" which provides the fraction of models in which air conditioning was standard equipment, and this suggests that the price increases may not be \pure price increases" but rather may reect quality upgrading.
A measure of acceleration is given by horsepower divided by w eight. This variable declined during the 1970's and rose during the 1980's. Vehicle size, measured as length times width has generally fallen. Cars have become better equipped, and this is proxied by the inclusion of air conditioning as standard equipment. In 1971, no car had it, while almost one third did by 1990. Finally, w e include a measure of the cost of driving: miles driven on one dollar's worth of gas. This variable has generally trended upwards, although the oil shocks are apparent. An important message to take from Table 1 is that most of the variables exhibit signicant trends, some well before the VERs, and we will want to account for this phenomenon in our empirical work.
The rst two columns of Table 2 compare sales weighted average real list prices of Japanese and domestic cars. From 1973 to 1979, prices of domestic vehicles stayed relatively constant. Either coinciding with the imposition of the VER in 1981, or one year prior to it, U.S. prices started to increase, and they continued to increase steadily throughout the rest of the sample. Japanese prices, on the other hand, began a fairly steady climb in 1976, several years prior to the VERs. Indeed, the largest annual jump in Japanese prices occurred between 1977 and 1978, well before the imposition of the VER. This suggests the possible importance of using data prior to the VERs when investigating the eects of the VER. Put another way, i f T able 2 began with 1981 data, it would appear that the VER had very strong inuences on Japanese prices. When we note that these prices were increasing prior to 1981, the evidence becomes less clear. The last four columns of Table 2 give sales and market shares. Prior to the imposition of the VER, the Japanese market share was rising, from 5.7 percent in 1971 to 21.3 percent in 1981. This was mostly at the expense of U.S. market share which fell from 86.6 to 74.0 percent, a fact that led some (but not all) of the Big Three auto makers to press for import relief.
One message suggested by T ables 1 and 2 is that there were many trends in the industry both pre-and post-1981. Prices and quantities do seem to change around 1981, but they exhibit as large or larger changes both before and after, and around 1981 we also seem to see a large change in the product mix.
To throw further light on the issues related to the VER, we consider a simple OLS hedonic regression of prices against characteristics and a combination of trends and time dummies (Table 3) . The regressors include four vehicle attributes (horsepower/weight, size, miles per dollar (MP$G), and air conditioning as standard), separate trends for the US (the omitted region), Europe, and Japan, as well as dummy v ariables for each of the three regions, the lagged and current exchange rate, and the current exchange rate interacted with region dummies. Appended to this list of regressors are year-specic dummy v ariables for Japan (the VER dummies) and the U.S.(the DOM dummies). The estimated regression had 2217 observations and an R 2 of .815. All included vehicle characteristics except MP$ contribute positively to ln(price) in a precise way. The coecient on MP$ is negative and signicant. Region dummy v ariables suggest that, conditional on other included characteristics, European products sell at a premium. The precisely estimated coecient on the overall trend indicates that prices are trending upwards. We pick u p v ery little exchange rate pass-through except in the case of the German DM.
The coecients on the VER and DOM dummy v ariables address a key question at hand: what was the relationship between the advent of the VERs and prices? The estimated coecients on the VER dummies in Table 3 are all negative and some are signicantly so. While we are hesitant t o draw conclusions from a hedonic regression, these results are nonetheless surprising in light of what seems to be the common wisdom. After accounting for trends and changes in vehicle characteristics, Japanese prices fell or at least did not seem to rise during the VER years. If the VER had the expected eect of increasing Japanese prices, then perhaps any fall in Japanese prices would have been greater absent the VER. During the same period, the coecients on the domestic dummy variables are usually positive. The bottom line is that simple least squares analysis yields puzzling results, but, due to the lack o f a n y underlying theory, it is hard to know what to make of them. We turn now to results from the estimated structural model.
Results
Recall that the structural parameters to be estimated are the means and variances of the distribution of the taste parameters in the utility function, the parameters of the cost function, and the implicit taxes associated with the VERs. We estimate means and variances of the tastes for: horsepower divided by w eight (HP/WT), vehicle size, whether air conditioning is standard (AIR), miles driven on one dollar's worth of gasoline (MP$), and for the utility associated with the outside alternative (the constant). We h a v e experimented with other vehicle attributes and, in BLP, w e report that the estimated elasticities and resulting markups are robust to reasonable changes. One variable that does not appear in our list of attributes is a measure of reliability a s given by a Consumers' Report rating. While we h a v e such data for several years, it has severe problems in a time series context since ratings are relative to other vehicles in a given year. Hence, the denition of the variable is changing year by y ear. Moreover inclusion of the reliability index never seemed to matter. We note that the problems caused by not including more characteristics are somewhat attenuated by the fact that the model explicitly allows for characteristics not included in the specication (our unobserved characteristics).
On the cost-side, we include a constant a s w ell as the following vehicle attributes: ln(HP/WT), ln(SIZE), and AIR. We include region dummies for Europe and Japan, as well as trends for the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Finally, w e also include the log of the exchange rate of the exporting country (lagged one year) and the log of the wage rate in the producing country. W e experimented with the contemporaneous exchange rate and found its eect was always about zero and imprecisely estimated.
We include VER dummies for each y ear since 1981, the year the policy was implemented. These dummy v ariables are set to one if the VER applies to that automobile model. As noted above, our base case assumes Japanese models produced in the U.S. did not count against the VER, while captive imports did. Note that this implies that Japanese wages and the yen to dollar exchange rate are determinants of costs for captive imports while U.S. wages are determinants of costs for the Japanese models produced in the U.S.
The estimates for our base case and their standard errors are given in Table 4 . We begin with a discussion of the demand side parameters. When interpreting these parameters, it is important to keep in mind that demand for a particular car is driven by the maximum, and not by the mean, of the utilities heterogeneous consumers place on that car. Hence, there are two w a ys to explain why cars with, say, high HP/WT are popular. Either a high mean for the distribution of tastes for HP/WT or a large variance of tastes will have a tendency to increase the share of consumers who buy cars with large values of HP/WT. The results in Table 4 show that the means ( 's) are all highly signicant. The standard deviations of the taste parameters for Size and MP$ are also signicant. The magnitudes of the standard deviations suggest that relative to their means, there is the most variance in the value of MP$.
On the cost-side, we nd that each attribute contributes positively to marginal cost and almost all of their coecients are quite precisely estimated. Japanese and European cars cost more to produce and transport, even after conditioning on wages and exchange rates. Domestic marginal costs are trending upwards, while Japanese and European marginal costs are trending slightly downwards. The elasticity of marginal cost with respect to wages is just over a third, not unreasonable for a production process with so large a materials component, while exchange rate pass-through is about zero. This last result is somewhat surprising, but experimentation suggests that it is robust. Exchange rates just do not seem to matter much. This nding contrasts to other estimates of exchange rate pass-through (see Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1993) ), but our estimates are based on on more disaggregated data and on a more detailed model of the industry.
There are several ways to interpret the magnitude of the utility and cost parameters. One way which is easy to understand and captures the information on both the utility and cost sides of the model is to examine price-marginal cost markups. These markups depend on the demand elasticities implied by the 's and 's as well as the marginal cost function parameters (all of which have been jointly estimated.) A representative sample of these markups for a handful of 1990 models representing the quality spectrum is presented in Table 5 . 16 These estimates appear quite reasonable and are generally in line with other studies. The standard errors of the markups are presented in column 4 and imply that the markups are quite precisely estimated. (A discussion of how the standard errors are computed is given below in the \Implications" subsection.)
The coecients on the VER dummies address the following question: Suppose the VER was instead implemented as a specic tax on Japanese automobiles, and no other aspect of the model changed. What is the level of that tax that would generate equilibrium prices equal to those we observe when we h a v e the VERs? A coecient (or tax) of zero, would imply that the VER was not binding, while larger values correspond to a larger implicit tax. These coecients are given in the bottom panel of Table 4 . In 1981 In , 1982 In , and 1983 , the point estimates are about zero with a standard error between $187 and $248. In these years, the point estimates imply that the VER had almost no eect on prices, and we cannot reject that the eect was nil. In 1984 and 1985, the point estimates of the implicit tax rise to $403 and $361 respectively, but these estimates have standard errors of $243 and $303. Again, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the VER was not binding, although it should be noted that two standard errors encompass a wide range of implicit taxes; i.e. while we cannot reject that the VER had no eect in 1984 and 1985, neither can we reject that the implicit tax was in the range of $600-$800. We adopt as our null hypothesis, though, the absence of any price eect of the VER and are unable to reject this null for 1981-85. It is perhaps not surprising that the VERs had no eect in 1981, as they were not implemented until mid-year. However, the lack o f a n y eect on equilibrium prices in 1982 and 1983 is likely to be surprising to some observers. Goldberg, for example, nds a large eect of the VER in 1983, the rst year of her sample. Nonetheless, our result is robust to the many dierent v ariants of our model we h a v e run.
Moreover, the available raw data are consistent with our results. The gures in table 2 indicate that total Japanese sales in the U.S. were below the VER limit in every year until 1986, the rst year we estimate a signicant VER dummy. It should be stressed that the export limits themselves are not used at all in our estimation algorithm, and hence provide some independent support for our results. We note again, though, the dierences between calendar year and VER year and between sales and shipments that make this comparison problematic. Further, the gures in Table 2 have not have not been adjusted for the nuances imposed by d and captive imports.
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There are several reasons why w e nd the VER did not initially bind. The most important o f them is that demand was low when the VERs were initially implemented. In 1981 the U.S. was 17 When we make our best guess of the number of vehicles that count against the VER, we nd that in no year did sales about equal the VER limit, although in 1983 sales were close to the limit (due to a surge in captive imports) and in 1986 sales fell only about 130,000 short of the 2.3 million limit. In most other years our guess was noticeably below the limits. both in the midst of a recession, and had a prime interest rate over 18 percent. The prime rate did not fall to below 10 percent u n til 1985, and as late as 1984 it was over 12 percent. This type of economic environment aects an industry as cyclical as the automobile industry very adversely. Thus, a simple interpretation of the insignicant estimates of the VER dummy parameters for [1981] [1982] [1983] is that in the middle of a severe recession, the VERs were set at a level that did not bind. Indeed, the VERs may w ell have been agreed to by the Japanese precisely because the Japanese realized that the promise of export restraints at the agreed level was both politically expedient and economically inexpensive at the time the agreement w as made. We return to the impact of macro variables on our results in the robustness discussion below.
In 1986, the VER begins to have a statistically signicant eect on prices in that we can no longer reject that the implicit tax was zero. In 1986, the point estimate of the implicit tax is $675 (with a standard error of $307). With an average price of Japanese cars at about $8,200, the VER is equivalent to about a 8.2 percent tax per Japanese car. (Recall the tax is specic, so it is much larger in percentage terms for inexpensive cars and less for costly ones.) The largest eects of the VERs are from 1987 to 1989, and this is again consistent with the notion that business cycles matter in this industry. During these years, the VER was equivalent to a tax of between $1277 (with a standard error of $458) and $1558 (with a standard error of $353.) In 1990, the estimated implicit tax falls to a still hefty $1063. Our estimate of the eect of the VER in 1990, though, is not very robust and should be interpreted with caution. (For a more extensive discussion of this point, see section 6.)
These are large eects and, by 1990, are somewhat surprising. For example, even with the fore-mentioned problems in comparing shipments or sales data to quota allocations, Nissan was surely not exporting its allocation at the end of our sample. Many industry observers have noted that although the VERs were still in eect in 1990 (they remained so until 1994), they were not important due to the increased direct foreign investment b y the Japanese into the U.S. Our base case results suggest otherwise. What might be going on here? There are multiple mutually nonexclusive explanations. Note that the VER dummies enter the rms' rst order conditions such that it captures price increases above those explained by marginal cost (including region dummies and region-specic trends) and the mark-up. A signicant VER dummy w ould occur if Japanese rms were induced, either by MITI, or by the U.S. or by cartelization to keep prices high and sales low relative to the no-VER Bertrand equilibrium. Indeed dynamic models involving political variables and/or cartel behavior could be built to rationalize this process. Another possible explanation is that while some rms may not have been constrained by the VER, others were. For example, while Nissan probably was not constrained, Mitsubishi (due to the many captive imports supplied to Chrysler) almost certainly was. Indeed, one reason exports under the VER were increased in the mid-1980's was probably the increase in captive imports. A third explanation is that some of the large estimated VER dummies in the later 1980's and especially 1990 are not always robust to specication testing. We return to a more detailed examination of these alternatives below.
Thus far, all description of the VERs has been positive, not normative. Sure, prices went up, but this is not all that surprising (though the timing and magnitude of the rises might be.) Insights from the strategic trade policy theoretical literature suggest that the prot-enhancing eect of the VER might make protection welfare enhancing in spite of the concurrent loss of consumer welfare. We turn now to a fuller investigation of the implications of our estimates on both prots and on consumer welfare.
Implications
In order to investigate the eects of the VER on prots and consumer welfare, we need to know what the industry equilibrium would have been in the absence of the VER. To determine that equilibrium, we set (the implicit tax) to zero, and solve for the vector of prices and vector of quantities for which the rms' rst order conditions hold and for which consumers maximize utility conditional on those prices. This assumes both that the equilibrium without the VER is also Nash in prices and that the equilibrium is unique (or at least that we solve for the relevant one.) It further assumes that the distribution of automobile characteristics would not have c hanged in the absence of the VER. This last assumption is probably more reasonable in the short run and less so in the longer run, since the time needed to change models is typically measured in years, not months. We only recompute the equilibrium for years in which was signicantly larger than zero. This is admittedly a somewhat arbitrary choice, but computational constraints played a role in this decision.
When we solve for the equilibrium that would obtain when is set to zero, we implicitly are making use of estimated parameters. Since the estimated parameters have standard errors associated with them, so does the new equilibrium. We compute these standard errors when evaluating policy implications of our estimates. Doing so is non-trivial. The ability to put standard errors on policy implications is one great advantage of econometric methods over the calibration methods that are commonly used in evaluating trade policy. H o w ever, because the policy implications are typically complicated non-linear transformations of the parameters, computational constraints have limited the extent to which standards errors have been presented.
One solution (the \delta method") is to linearize the policy implications in the parameters. We avoid this linearization and instead take a more direct Monte Carlo approach. To implement this, we take n = 175 draws of parameters from the estimated asymptotic normal distribution of the parameters.
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For each of these draws, we resolve the entire model and then calculate the implied policy implications. The empirical standard deviation of these policy implications, across the n draws, is then a consistent estimate of the true standard error of the policy implications.
We rst turn our attention to the prot-shifting side of the story. The eects of the VER on prices and prots are given in Table 6 . There, we report the sales-weighted average price of Japanese, American, and European cars as well as prots with and without the VER, the dierence between the VER and no VER cases, and the standard error of this dierence. These gures are given for each y ear in which w e estimated a statistically signicant VER coecient. As expected, the prices of Japanese cars were driven up by the VER.
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Note that in a Nash pricing game, when at least some of the products are strategic complements, prices can rise by either more or less than the amount of the tax. Our estimates indicate that both occur.
The issue of strategic complements and substitutes is an important one in this study. In dierentiated products price-setting models, it is usual to think of prices as being strategic complements. In these cases, an exogenous rise in a competitor's price will raise own-rm prices. The intuition that price-setting models yield strategic complements comes from linear models in which the competitor's price aects the intercept, but not the slope, of the own-product demand curve. However, in typical discrete choice models both the intercept and the slope change as the rivals prices change: the demand curve shifts out and becomes more price-sensitive. The change in the slope can occur because those customers who shift away from the rival product are those who are more price-sensitive than average. These price elastic consumers might induce a decrease in own-rm prices in response to a rival's price increase. Thus, we can obtain either strategic complements or substitutes.
20
The VER increased Japanese prices fairly dramatically. Prices increased by around $750 in 18 We experimented with more draws but found that computational time went up linearly while standard errors remained stable. With substantially fewer draws, estimates became noisy.
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Note that since the VERs induce a dierent combination of cars to be purchased, throughout this table the weights used when the VER is assumed operative are dierent than the weights when it is not. We nd that the prices of U.S. autos were little aected by the VER. U.S. prices rose by only about $200 in 1987 and 1988 due to the VER. In other years the increase was less than about $80 and the standard error was never more than $28. Recall that in our model, consumers are heterogeneous. Our results suggest that as Japan raised prices, price sensitive consumers switched to U.S. automobiles, and, as a result, markups did not increase much. However, while prices of domestically produced cars were not much c hanged due to the VER, sales increased signicantly, and this is reected in the increased prots earned by U.S. rms. The second set of columns in Table 6 indicates that U.S. prots increased by about $3.09 billion in 1987 and by $2.76 billion in 1988. Even in 1986, when we nd the VER had a relatively small eect on prices, U.S. prots increased by about $1.6 billion due to the VER. This is the prot-shifting aspect of a strategic trade policy. The standard errors of the dierence in prots is large (t-statistics are somewhere between 1 and 2.) Hence, while point estimates suggest that U.S. prots increased, these estimates are not precise. (Since prots depend implicitly on hundreds of elasticities, it may not be that surprising that even if each elasticity is tightly estimated, the change in the level of prots is not that tightly estimated.) While U.S. prots were much increased by the VER, Japanese prots did not fall a corresponding amount. Our estimates imply that Japanese prots were basically unaected by the VER. In 1986, point estimates imply that Japanese prots rose by $111 million while in 1988 they fell by $110 million. In other years, the gure is somewhere between these two. These are not large numbers. Neither are they precisely estimated. The standard error of the dierence in Japanese prots is on the order of $300-$400 million. Two factors contributed to the relatively small decrease in Japanese prots. First, apparently a large fraction of consumers had relatively inelastic demands for the Japanese models; these consumers preferred paying the increased Japanese prices to shifting their demand to other models. Second, with the VER, as opposed to a tari, the Japanese rms did not have t o p a y the implicit tax. Instead they kept the \revenue" such a tax would have generated and this is reected in the higher prices. VERs are sometimes referred to as bribes to the foreign rm, for Japanese prots might h a v e been lower had the VER instead been implemented as a tari or regular quota.
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The theoretical literature has recognized that a quota (or, in this case, VER) might act to raise industry prots. Our point estimates imply this was indeed the case, although our estimates of the change in prots resulting from the VER have relatively large standard errors.
Prots are only part of the economic welfare equation. Another key component is consumer welfare. We compute the compensating variation in the following way. First take a draw from the estimated distribution of tastes and the distribution of income. This draw can be thought o f a s a simulated household. Next, compute which product gives the highest utility at the VER (i.e. the actual) prices and the resulting utility. N o w nd the income which generates the same level of utility at the non-VER prices (i.e. the prices we obtained when we solved for the industry equilibrium in the absence of the VER). The change between this income and the initial draw on the household's income is the compensating variation.
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To estimate the expected compensating variation for a randomly chosen household, we do this a large number of times and take the average. Multiplying this expectation by the number of households in the economy gives the total compensating variation. The estimates in tables 7 and 8 use 10,000 draws (though we h a v e conducted much of the exercise with 100,000 draws and the results only change in the third decimal point). Table 7 provides estimates, for 1987, of how household-level compensating variation changes with the imposition of the VER. This table begins to address the question of who bears the burden of the VER. The rst two r o ws look at the economy-wide aggregates. The rst row gives the average change in the price of the good actually purchased. There we note that prices rise on average $18. Most households (about 90 percent) did not purchase a car in a given year, and for these households, the price change was zero. Hence the average gure hides a great deal of variation. The standard deviation of the change in the price of the good purchased under the VER is $277, while at least one product's price rose by $2369 and another's fell by $499. The latter is due to the presence of strategic substitutes. The economy-wide average compensating variation gure implies that the VER cost the household, on average, $41, although this gure was as great as $2366 for some households. Again due to the strategic substitutes, some households were made $483 better o by the VER.
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It should be noted, however, that Japanese prots are actually somewhat lower than what is reported in Table  6 . This is because some of the dierence between price and cost is kept by the dealer, and these dealers are typically domestically owned.
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A further discussion of this method and other applications are found in Pakes, Berry, and Levinsohn (1993) .
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The next three pairs of lines in Table 7 decompose the economy-wide averages. We estimate that the imposition of the VER would, on average, leave those households who (under the VER) purchased a car $317 worse o. This gure reects the twin facts that auto purchasers were adversely aected by a signicant amount and that most households in a given year are not auto purchasers. The $317 gure is aggregated over households who purchased a Japanese car (when the VER was imposed) and those that purchased a domestic car. These two groups fared quite dierently under the VER. On average the VER cost households that bought a Japanese car $1242. On the other hand, the VER cost households that purchased a domestic car only about $30. Consumers of domestic cars themselves were not that adversely aected by the VER. Table 8 gives the bottom line on our evaluation of the VERs as a strategic trade policy. There, we compute the components of aggregate welfare for each of the years in which the VER was estimated to be binding in our base case. The rst column gives the change in domestic prots. The second column gives the compensating variation and is negative since the protection cost domestic consumers. The third column gives the sum of the rst two columns and represents the net change in welfare for the VER as it was actually implemented. The fourth column presents the foregone tari revenue (had an import tari been used instead of the implicit export tax we model.) The fth column then lists the welfare gain that would have resulted if the VER was instead implemented as a tari, and no other change occured in the nature of the equilibrium. The bottom row of the table gives the cumulative totals over the multiple years, and that is the row on which w e focus. Standard errors of all gures are given in parentheses. All gures are in 1983 dollars. In current (1996) dollars, the amounts would be inated by around 50 percent.
The rst eect of the VER was to increase the pure prots of U.S. rms by about 10.2 billion dollars. It is hard to evaluate the magnitude of this gure. To put it into some perspective, though, our estimates imply that the pure prots (not including xed costs) from Japanese automobile sales in the U.S. in 1990 were about 7.6 billion (1983) dollars, while the prots of U.S. rms in 1990 were about $23.1 billion. It seems that the prot shifting eects of the VERs was not negligible.
On the other hand, the burden placed on U.S. consumers was not negligible either as the compensating variation of the VERs was just over $13.1 billion. The standard error of this gure is $2.48 billion. The net change in welfare due to the VERs was about -$2.9 billion. Due to the large standard error on the change in prots, the net change has a relatively large standard error{ $7.56 billion.
When one evaluates the typical trade policy, the welfare components number three: prots, consumer welfare, and tari revenue. The VER was implemented such that it gave the latter of these back to the Japanese rms or government. Suppose the U.S. had instead opted for the tari that would have resulted in the same industry equilibrium observed under the VER. We assume that all imports from Japan generate tari revenue, and this includes captive imports as well as the made-in-Japan portion of production of models which w ere also produced in the U.S. (i.e. Camrys made in Japan raise tari revenue while those made in Kentucky do not.) This policy would have generated almost $11.2 billion dollars in revenue for the U.S. government. The foregone revenue with a VER is sometimes referred to as the bribe paid in order to induce Japan to agree to the policy in the rst place. Our (precise) estimates suggest this was a hefty bribe. When this gure is added to the net change computed in the third column of Table 8 , the welfare gain from the VERs totals $8.34 billion. Our point estimates suggest that if the government been able to impose a tari without changing any of the other conditions in the market, the implied protection of the automobile industry could have enhanced U.S. welfare for exactly the sort of reasons that came out of the early theoretical models of trade policy and imperfect competition. Nonetheless, this net gure has a standard error as large as the net gure itself. In terms of what was precisely estimated, we conclude that the decrease in consumer welfare was about equal to the foregone tari revenue.
Does this suggest that taris on Japanese automobiles would be in the U.S. economic interest? There are several reasons why this might not be so. For example, we do not model retaliation (nor, though, do most theoretical models of strategic trade policy.) Surely one reason to implement a VER instead of an outright tari or quota was that the VER bribed the Japanese government into not retaliating. Furthermore, a tari directed solely at Japanese products would violate the GATT. Also, we are assuming that the imposition of a tari would not cause Japanese rms to stop marketing some of their models in the U.S. If models were pulled o the U.S. market then consumers with inelastic, as well as those with elastic, demand for that model would be adversely aected.
Just as there are good reasons, though, to wonder whether the $8.341 billion gure might b e unrealistically high, there are also good reasons to believe i t i s t o o l o w. First, we h a v e estimated the welfare eects of the VERs as actually implemented, and there is no reason to believe that they were set to optimize welfare. Second, our theoretical and empirical work did not account for monopoly rents accruing to U.S. workers in the automobile industry.
Sensitivity Analyses
Along the way to the punchlines provided in the last section, we h a v e made several possibly objectionable assumptions. For example, we assumed the rms played a Bertrand game, that rms' underlying cost functions were the same, and that the export limits were either binding or not binding on all rms in any given year. We c hose not to ignore d or captive imports, but did ignore some key ways in which the macro-economy might aect automobile demand. We also assumed that quality c hanges were exogenous. In this section, we ask, do changes in these assumptions aect our major conclusions.
23 Table 9 provides results from seven of the alternative specications we tried. The base case was estimated under a Bertrand assumption. We i n v estigate how robust our results are to a Cournot as well as to a Mixed Nash assumption. We also investigate the possibility that the VER led to collusion among Japanese rms while the Japanese rms collectively maintained a Bertrand strategy vis a vis non-Japanese rms.
There are many w a ys to compare results across specications: demand elasticities, markups, prots (which use information from each of the previous two), and the coecients on the VER dummies. Since the focus of this study is on trade policy, w e opt for the latter.
The rst column of Table 9 replicates the VER multipliers from our base case. The second column has the estimates obtained under the assumption of Cournot behavior. These estimates are obtained from a structural model in which the rms' rst order conditions and resulting markup have been amended to reect the Cournot assumption.
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With the Cournot assumption, we nd that the multiplier on the 1990 VER dummy v ariable is less precisely estimated, and we can no longer reject the hypothesis that the VER did not bind that year. On the other hand, the dummy variable for the VER in 1985 becomes statistically signicant. Other than 1985 and 1990, the VER is found to be binding in the same set of years as when price setting was assumed to be Bertrand (though the magnitude of the VER multiplier was quite a bit larger in 1986, and somewhat smaller in the other years than in our base case).
A possibly more realistic alternative to Bertrand is the Mixed Nash case. Here the Japanese
23
There is also the issue of the shape of our objective function, in particular the presence of local minima, and the ability of our numerical procedures (which includes a choice of starting values and of stopping tolerances) to nd its overall minimum. We experimented with alternate starting values and tolerances and sometimes found the minimization algorithm stopping at local minima that were slightly dierent than the overall minima reported in the text. In particular some of these alternate runs indicated that the VER had a larger eect in 1985 and a smaller eect in 1990 than the results reported in the text suggest (though these dummies were never signicant in 1981 to 1984, and were always signicant b e t w een 1987 and 1989). The VER dummy coecients on 1985 and especially 1990 are least stable. Our selected base case is the most representative of our results, but it may be that the VER had a larger eect in 1985 and a smaller eect in 1990 than the base case results suggest. The results for these years, then, should be interpreted with caution.
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All else is as in the base case. i.e. We use the same: i) starting values; ii) model for d and captive imports; and iii) the same simulation draws as in the base case. 29 rms set quantities while other rms set prices. 25 If one believed that there were strict export limits given to the Japanese rms, a model where these rms set quantities seems more plausible. The VER multipliers we obtained when we re-estimated our model under the Mixed Nash assumption are given in the third column of Table 9 . They are, in terms of magnitudes of estimates and standard errors, very close to those obtained under the Bertrand assumption. The VERs bind in all the same years and the implied specic tax is about the same across the two specications. We conclude that while it may be reasonable to estimate the model under alternative static equilibrium concepts, it doesn't really seem to impact the policy conclusions drawn. A c a v eat is in order, though. While the results are robust to the various specications of the equilibrium, it remains the case in all results presented that the demand and cost sides of the model have been estimated simultaneously. In principle, one could estimate the demand-side of the model alone and then use the estimated elasticities to investigate the cost side of the model. This would be more exible and would impose less structure on the utility function parameter estimates. We h a v e tried to do this, and are unable to obtain precise estimates of many of the parameters of interest. We conclude that, absent more data, the equilibrium rst-order conditions on the cost side contribute to the precision of the demand-side estimates. We are currently working on developing methods, using consumer-level data, that might allow one to estimate the demand-side independently of any equilibrium assumptions. See, for example, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1997) .
The fourth column of Table 9 presents the VER multipliers from the collusion case. The thought experiment here is that the VER induced Japanese rms to collude. From a modeling perspective, this essentially changes the rms' rst-order conditions such that all Japanese rms act like a single multi-product oligopolist. The estimated VER multipliers are quite similar to the base case, although the 1985 coecient becomes statistically signicant while the 1986 coecient becomes statistically insignicant. All point estimates, though, are within one standard deviation of the base case estimates.
Since d production was not subject to any restraints, one would expect the presence of d to diminish the trade restraining aspect of the VERs. On the other hand, we w ould not necessarily expect d to render the VERs ineectual for three reasons. First, it takes time to build an automobile plant and bring it up to capacity. Second, the amount of capacity built in the U.S. is determined by perceptions of the future implications of that capacity, including its potential political ramications, and there is good reason to believe that the U.S. capacity of Japanese models was not built 25 Once again, we are simply assuming that such an equilibrium exists and then showing that it does exist at the estimated parameter values. up as fast as otherwise would have been expected. For example, although production costs in 1994 were widely believed to be lower in the U.S. than in Japan for the same vehicle, there were no major new plants on the drawing boards, and this is due in part to political concerns. (Restrictions on Japanese capacity in the U.S. were reported to be discussed during President Bush's \auto" trip to Japan.) Third, if production costs were lower in Japan than in the U.S., the VER might still bind even with the presence of d. To i n v estigate how treating d dierently (and eectively ignoring it) might alter our results, the model is re-estimated ignoring the eects of d on the underlying structural model. These results are presented in the fth column of Table 9 .
The general pattern is one in which the VER dummies are similar to the base case, with a few exceptions. When we ignore d, the VER appears to be binding in 1985 and not binding in 1986 or 1990. More importantly, ignoring d does not aect our nding that the VER contributed to higher prices for Japanese cars in the later 1980's, but not in the rst four years of the policy. Although the coecient estimates of the VER dummies are not that dierent from the base case, the welfare implications are. This is because the implicit tari revenue foregone is much higher when d is ignored, since no-d assumption would attribute foregone tari revenue to all the cars actually produced by Japanese rms in the U.S.
The next column of Table 9 gives the results when we ignore the role of captive imports. This specication is estimated in order to determined whether ignoring captive imports (as previous studies have) matters to our main results. We nd that the results of the no captive imports specication are quite similar to the base case. The main dierence is that by ignoring captive imports, it appears that the VER signicantly raised prices in 1985, and possibly also in 1984, while our base case indicates the contrary. Although the coecients are not that dierent for the no captive imports case, the welfare consequences of ignoring the captive imports are large. Like the story with d, this occurs because with captive imports, the consequences for foregone tari revenue are large.
The next-to-last column of Table 9 presents the VER dummies when an attempt is made to account for macroeconomic inuences on the demand system. These runs included GNP and the prime interest rate as linear terms in the utility function. These terms do not have random coecients. The GNP variable had a positive coecient on it (with a t-statistic of around 2) while the prime interest rate had a negative coecient on it (with a t-statistic of around -10). Including these variables is quite ad hoc.. In principle, one can argue that shifts in income are already captured by the inclusion of household income in the utility function. Also, while the interest rate certainly matters, it just as certainly would not enter a structural dynamic model of automobile demand in the simple manner with which w e experiment. We include these variables, though, to investigate, albeit loosely, whether including some macroeconomic demand shifters substantively alters our conclusions about the VERs. As VER dummies in the last column indicate, our results are not that dierent. We nd that the 1985 coecient becomes signicant, while the 1986 and 1990 coecients become insignicant, and the other coecients are slightly smaller in magnitude. This suggests that ignoring macroeconomic inuences may make the VER look slightly more binding than in fact it was.
Finally, w e i n v estigate the robustness of our results to the implicit assumption that all rms have the same underlying cost function. There are of course many w a ys in which cost functions might dier across rms. As a rst pass at this issue, we allow rm-specic xed eects in the cost function and re-estimate the model with these 26 xed eects. The estimated VER multipliers from this experiment are given in the last column o Table 9 . The main dierence between this case and the base case is that the 1986 coecient becomes statistically insignicant.
We also conducted some sensitivity analyses in which more than just yearly VER dummies were estimated. Recall that the base case imposed that the export limits were either binding or not binding on all Japanese rms in a given year. Anecdotal evidence suggests that perhaps the smaller Japanese rms were more constrained by the VER (at least in the early years). An approach which would be robust to this and other contingencies would be to estimate separate VER dummies for each rm in each y ear. This, though, is computationally infeasible and would, in any case, generate imprecise estimates. A middle ground between the infeasible ideal and the base case is to estimate one multiplier for the Big Two in Japan (Toyota and Nissan) and another for the other Japanese rms. The results suggested that the smaller rms might h a v e been more constrained in the rst few years of the VER, although the eect is imprecisely measured. The anecdotal evidence may have a grain of truth to it.
The VER, as modeled, enters costs as a year-specic dummy v ariable for Japanese rms beginning in 1981. There are myriad stories that might lead to an observationally equivalent estimating equation. The VER eects show up as deviations from costs, conditional on trends and cost-shifters, in the very particular way implied by the rms' rst order conditions. We estimated the model with quadratic region-specic trends instead of the linear ones. The VER coecients for 1986 and 1990 cease to be signicantly dierent from zero.
As a \common sense" test of our results, we re-estimated the model with two other sets of country-year dummy v ariables. Each e n ter the cost function just as the VER did. In one specication, the model was re-estimated using \VER" dummies for every year, even those prior to the VER. If we w ere to consistently nd signicant eects of the \VERs" in the years prior to 1981, one might w onder whether the results for the years after 1980 were really picking up the trade restraints or something altogether dierent. The coecients on the VER dummy v ariables were insignicantly dierent from zero throughout the 1970s. During the years that the VER was actually in place, the only changes relative to the base case are that the coecients on the VER in some years were slightly smaller and usually less precisely estimated.
The model was also estimated with year-specic dummy v ariables for domestic rms during the 1980's. Again, had these dummy v ariables matched the pattern of the Japanese VER multipliers, one might w onder whether something other than the VER might be motivating the base case results. We found that only one of the 10 year-specic dummy v ariables for domestic rms was signicantly dierent from zero{ about what we w ould expect if all were zero at the 90 percent level of statistical signicance. The point estimates were all quite small.
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The model was estimated allowing tastes to dier in the 1970s. This was done by allowing the means of the tastes distributions to dier in the 1970s while constraining the variances of the taste distributions to remain constant o v er the sample. This was required in order to keep the estimation computationally feasible. The results suggest that the marginal utility of size and air conditioning was lower in the 1970's, a period during which gas prices were high. We can reject that tastes were constant o v er the sample. The estimated VER coecients, though, remain substantively the same as the base case.
Finally, w e h a v e assumed that quality c hanges are exogenous. That is, while upgrading occurred, we do not model this as a policy-induced response. Our results, then, are conditional on the exogeneity of the existing product attributes.
From Table 9 and our other sensitivity analyses, we conclude that our base case results are reasonably robust to several plausible alternative specications. Because the results seem so robust, it is natural to question why they do not replicate the messages of the existing literature on the eect of the VER. Our results are not very much at odds with Feenstra's and the dierences are explainable. Feenstra (1988) found substantial quality upgrading, and we also nd this in our data. Feenstra found that the VER was initially binding. His methods and data, though, were quite dierent. He did not use data for the decade prior to the VERs, and he estimated separate sets of coecients for Japanese cars. Finally, his methods are much more in the spirit of a reduced form, and the underlying framework is not nearly as structural as our equilibrium oligopoly model. (His work also predates ours by about a decade, and many of the econometric tools at our disposal were not available then.) When we use the same years of data as Feenstra and employ simple hedonic regressions as he did, we nd that we replicate the gist of his results. The VERs appear binding in the early years, but their magnitude is small and not always precisely estimated. When we add our oligopoly structure, but continue to allow Japanese cars to have dierent cost functions, we no longer nd that the VERs were initially binding. We conclude that what dierences there are between our results and Feenstra's emanate from dierent i n terpretations to the hedonic regression; we h a v e a model which allows us to impute changes in that regression to changes in underlying costs, in markups, and in the implications of trade policy (the VER dummies).
Though Goldberg's (1995) methods are a lot more similar to ours than Feenstra's, her results, unlike those of Feenstra, are, in some respects, quite dierent from ours. In particular, as noted earlier, Goldberg nds that the VER was binding in the early years. We i n v estigated several possible sources of this dierence but could not account for it. Goldberg did not use data from years prior to the VER, had fewer years of data for the later 1980's, and made use of consumer-level data using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. When we estimate our model using only the same years of data as Goldberg, we continue to nd that the VER did not initially bind. We allowed for trends in the data that Goldberg does not account for. We again re-estimate our model excluding all trends. Again, our results remain at odds with Goldberg's. As noted above, ignoring or including macroeconomic variables, direct foreign investment, and/or captive imports do not substantively change our results, and hence could not reconcile them with those reported by Goldberg. We speculate on two possible reasons for the dierence. We account for the econometric endogeneity of price, while Goldberg does not. Using consumer-level automobile purchase data (not used in the analysis of this paper), we nd that ignoring this endogeneity substantially biases the estimates and that the resulting elasticities are aected. Since these elasticities are key to the analysis, this may account for the dierence. Secondly, the demand structures in this study and in Goldberg's are quite dierent and this too may matter.
Conclusions and Caveats
Our estimates indicate that the VERs aected prices, although not necessarily in the years most expected. They raised Japanese prices and domestic sales. The prots of domestic rms increased substantially while those of Japanese rms were less aected. Domestic consumer welfare fell, also quite signicantly, and this burden fell disproportionately on consumers with relatively inelastic demands for Japanese products. The \give-away" to Japan in terms of foregone tari revenue was very large. In sum, our point estimates imply that if taris could have been instituted without setting o other changes in the market (in particular with no changes in the cars marketed in the U.S. and no retaliatory responses by the Japanese), strategic trade policy could have enhanced U.S. economic welfare.
When the rst economic models of strategic trade policy were being introduced, most of the founders of that literature went to some length to make clear that their models did not mean the traditional arguments for free trade had become inapplicable. This paper may be the rst detailed econometric study of a strategic trade policy and similar caveats are in order.
We h a v e computed the standard errors around each of these policy implications. These suggest researchers ought to be circumspect about making policy conclusions even when the individual parameters of the structural model are themselves precisely estimated. We are unable to precisely estimate the impact of the VER on prots. The foregone tari revenue and the compensating variation, though, are precisely estimated and our estimates suggest that these two components of welfare about cancel each other out.
Standard errors around policy conclusions are only one reason to view the results in this paper with care. The underlying structural model is not a dynamic model and this has multiple implications. First, automobiles are a durable good and expectations about how long the VER was expected to last surely impacted production and consumption decisions. Second, as noted earlier, we take as exogenous both the set of products rms bring to the market and the attributes of those products. A more involved dynamic model would allow one to model these endogenously. Third, we do not model myriad other aspects of the dynamics of automobile purchases such a s nancing, expected depreciation and resale value. Fourth, on the demand-side, we h a v e assumed that the underlying distributions of tastes are constant. If tastes changed over time due for example to learning, these changes might impact our results. In sum, we realize these dynamic issues are important, and this too adds to our caution in interpreting the results.
Appendix: An Approximation to \Optimal" Instruments Following Chamberlin (1986) , the ecient set of instruments when we h a v e only conditional moment restrictions is: This formula is very intuitive: larger weights should be given to the observations that generate disturbances whose computed values are very sensitive to the choice of (at = 0 ). Unfortunately D j (z) i s t ypically dicult to compute. Since the required derivatives are a function of prices, to calculate D j (z) w e w ould have to calculate the pricing equilibrium for dierent f j ; ! j gsequences, take derivatives at the equilibrium prices, and then integrate out over the distribution of such sequences.
We propose to replace the expectation D j (z) with the appropriate derivatives evaluated at the expectation of the unobservables. To construct such derivatives, we take the following steps:
(i) Obtain an initial estimate from an initial run using cruder instruments.
(ii) Use to construct exogenous estimates of and mc: = x andmc = w. Further detail and some intuition for a simpler model can be found in the 1995 NBER version of this paper. Notes: The \originally purchased good" refers to the good purchased when the VER was in place. 
